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he main challenge currently facing the EU is a 
community deficit: the low valuation the majority 
of its citizens accord the evolving collectivity. The 
EU is challenged by the mismatch between its increasing 
supranational decision making and the strong loyalties of 
its citizens to their respective nation states.
1 To deal with 
this community deficit, the EU must either introduce 
strong measures of community building or else 
significantly scale back its plans for action in unison. 
I first briefly cite illustrative data to show that there is a 
considerable level of disaffection from the EU project 
and the EU institutions (section 1). I then turn to examine 
the first set of measures needed to reduce the strain on the 
EU by scaling back for the near future those provisions 
that alienate many citizens (section 2). A second set of 
measures is needed to build up citizens’ commitment to 
the EU, by fostering public dialogue, developing a 
common European media and language, and holding EU-
wide elections (section 3).  
1.  Signs of disaffection 
Given that it is widely agreed that there is a considerable 
level of disaffection from the EU project and the EU 
authorities, I merely provide a few illustrative pieces of 
evidence rather than review the considerable literature on 
the subject.
2  
                                                      
1 On supranational communities see Amitai Etzioni, From 
Empire to Community, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004. 
2 For a review of this literature, see e.g. Lauren McLaren, 
“Explaining Mass-level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests, and 
Institutional Distrust”, Acta Politica, 42:2-3, July 2007, pp. 
233-251. 
 
A 2002 study shows that “a majority of West Europeans 
does not believe that the EU represents them; these 
perceptions not only increase dissatisfaction with the 
current EU-framework but also lower support for a 
future, EU-wide government.”
3 Those few nations in 
which the majority felt well-represented by the EU are 
small and possess limited political clout, such as 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland. (Notably, Ireland 
recently endangered the movement towards deepening by 
voting down the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.) The largest and 
most powerful nations such as France, Germany and the 
UK had much lower rates of support.
4 More recently, a 
study has shown that “the largest group of Europeans 
remains hesitant about European integration, either 
expressing support or opposition for either deepening or 
widening.”
5 And a 2008 study demonstrates that “there 
has been a dramatic collapse in the popular legitimacy of 
the EU since the early 1990s”.
6 
This euroscepticism, as it is commonly referred to, seems 
to be on the rise and is reported to be tied to national 
identities that have become both stronger and more 
                                                      
3 Robert Rohrschneider, “The Democracy Deficit and Mass 
Support for an EU-wide Government,” American Journal of 
Political Science, 46:2, April 2002, pp. 463-475.  
4 Ibid., p. 467. 
5 Jeffrey Karp and Shaun Bowler, “Broadening and deepening 
or broadening versus deepening: The question of enlargement 
and Europe’s ‘hesitant Europeans’”, European Journal of 
Political Research 45, 2006, pp. 369-390.  
6 Simon Hix, What’s wrong with the European Union and how 
to Fix it, Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008, p. 51. 
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exclusive.
7 This trend is especially significant in 
Germany, where people had long shied away from 
national identification after World War II, preferring to 
see themselves as European. True, citizens of several EU 
member states with weak, corrupt or inefficient national 
institutions – Italy for instance – are more likely to favour 
EU institutions, viewing them as less corrupt and more 
efficient.
8 This, however, is not the case for the majority 
of EU citizens.
9 True, many Europeans would like the EU 
to do more in matters concerning foreign policy; for 
instance, some suggest that a majority of Europeans 
would likely favour the creation of a common EU 
diplomatic service, a European FBI and common EU 
representation in international organisations to speak with 
one voice. However, support for such moves might 
quickly recede if ‘Brussels’ were to take specific steps in 
these matters, for instance, by ruling that EU involvement 
in Afghanistan must be doubled and demanding that each 
member nation commit a given number of troops to the 
effort, or by confronting Russia regarding its intervention 
in Georgia, or by substantially increasing defence 
spending.  
In the 2004 European Parliament elections, anti-EU 
parties had their strongest showing yet. The United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which demands 
Britain's full withdrawal from the EU, took 12 seats in 
the Parliament, while the mainstream but largely 
eurosceptic Conservatives took 27. In Poland, the anti-
EU League of Polish Families took more seats than all 
parties but one. The Movement for France, which rejects 
both the euro and France's EU membership, held onto its 
three seats, and the Swedish anti-EU June Movement 
won 3 seats.
10  
                                                      
7 See e.g. Adam Luedke, “European Integration, Public 
Opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of 
National Identity”, European Union Politics, 6:1, 2005, pp. 83-
112; Sean Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an 
Obstacle to European Integration?”, European Union Politics 
3:4, 2002, pp. 387-413; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 
“Europe’s Blues: Theoretical Soul-searching after the 
Rejection of the European Constitution”, PS: Political Science 
and Politics 39, 2006, pp. 247-250; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary 
Marks, “Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on 
European Integration”, European Union Politics 6, 2005, pp. 
419-443; Juan Diez Medrano, Framing Europe: Attitudes to 
European Integration in Germany, Spain and the United 
Kingdom,  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003; 
Richard Herrmann, Marilynn Brewer and Thomas Risse (eds), 
Identities in Europe and the Institutions of the European 
Union, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004; Lauren 
McLaren, “Public Support for the European Union: 
Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?”, Journal 
of Politics 64, 2002, pp. 551-66. 
8 Rohrschneider, op. cit. 
9 Ibid. 
10 William Horsley, “Eurosceptics storm the citadel”, British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 14 June 2004 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3806503.stm Accessed: 20 
August 2008). 
True, the treaties that were rejected first by the French 
and the Dutch and later by the Irish, lost by a small 
margin. But one cannot ignore the fact that, in 2008, 26 
out of 27 national governments – including 11 that had 
previously committed to doing so – did not allow their 
citizens to vote on the Lisbon Treaty, presumably fearing 
its rejection. Most recently, the Danish government 
decided to defer “indefinitely” a referendum on three 
measures that would have deepened Danish involvement 
in the EU.
11 
Others have reached similar conclusions. Andrew 
Moravcik, of Harvard University, writes: 
For the first time in a generation, European elites and 
public outside the extreme Right and Left expressed 
fundamental doubts about the desirability of major 
steps toward European Integration…The polarization 
of public and elite opinion appears to be eroding the 
broad consensus that supported integration for the 
past three decades.
12 
And, he concludes: “There is considerable evidence that 
[European voters] oppose integration today. Hence, in the 
short term, democratization is almost certain to 
undermine integration.”
13 
Some argue that popular alienation from the EU stems in 
large part from political cues given by national elites who 
see the rise of the EU as a threat to their power.
14 Others 
propose that economic factors are key in explaining 
popular opinion.
15 Such explanations speak not to the end 
state but merely to the causes of disaffection, of which 
there are clearly several. The fact, though, remains that a 
substantial and seemingly growing number of European 
citizens are alienated from the EU project and the EU 
institutions.  
To reiterate, the evidence presented here is intended 
merely to illustrate the point at issue, which, in any case, 
seems to be fairly well established. 
2.  Measures to reduce strain and alienation:  
A grand EU pause 
To treat this disaffection, the EU needs to adopt the 
following measures, amounting to a consolidation period 
or a grand ‘pause’, before further steps can be taken that 
significantly diminish national sovereignty. 
                                                      
11 “Hoist by its own policy”, The Economist, 16 August 2008, 
pp. 53-54. 
12 Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe’s Integration at Century’s 
End,” in Andrew Moravcsik (ed.), Centralization or 
Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, 
Diversity and Democracy, New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1998, pp. 1-58:4. 
13  Ibid., p. 50. 
14 Hooghe and Marks, “Calculation, Community and Cues”, 
op. cit.  
15 McLaren, “Explaining Mass-Level Euroskepticism”, op. cit. Closing the Community Deficit in the EU | 3 
a.  Defer enlargement 
The EU needs to defer additional enlargement for a 
decade to allow for consolidation. Given that the 
negotiations for new membership strain the EU long 
before the members are actually admitted, such 
considerations also need to be suspended. Enlargement 
strains the community in two significant ways: i) 
increasing the sheer numbers of any group renders 
collective decision-making more difficult and ii) given 
the cultural, historical, political and linguistic differences 
between the current and potential members, further 
enlargement would increase the already high level of 
heterogeneity of the EU, which, as Communitarians have 
long shown, is antithetical to community-building.
16 Only 
after reducing the current high level of heterogeneity can 
more members be added – or even considered – without 
further undermining community-building.  
Many scholars and public officials who favour 
enlargement point to the several commendable effects 
that the offer of potential EU membership has on the 
countries that are keen to join and expect to become 
members of the EU. Some have shown that the prospect 
and/or conditions of accession to the EU provide 
sufficient incentives for significant democratisation and 
liberalisation.
17 However, it is far from obvious that the 
EU should endanger its future in order to advance 
reforms in other countries. Moreover, saving the EU from 
its own altruism by introducing a temporary pause on 
enlargement is needed not merely for the sake of its 
current members, but also to nurture the community that 
these other countries seek to join. While it may be, in 
some sense, noble to tear down the pillars that uphold 
your house in order to provide logs for a new friend’s 
fireplace, this is hardly the case if you have just invited 
him to move into the same house.  
b.  Delay deepening 
Several analysts and leaders have correctly identified a 
need for significant increases in the scope and import of 
supranational decision-making.
18 They seek a state of 
                                                      
16 See e.g. Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification Revisited: On 
Building Supranational Communities, New York, NY: 
Lexington Books, 2001. 
17 See e.g. Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota, and Martin 
Krygier (eds), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law?: 
The Impact of EU Enlargement for the Rule of Law, 
Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Legal 
Orders, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Publishing 
Company, 2006; Tim Haughton, “When Does the EU Make a 
Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in 
Central and Eastern Europe”, Political Studies Review 5:2, 
2007, pp 233-246; Geoffrey Pridham, “European Union 
Accession Dynamics and Democratization in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Past and Future Perspectives”, Government 
and Opposition, 41:3, June 2006, pp. 373–400. 
18 I use the term “supranationality” to characterise a political 
body that has acquired some of the attributes usually associated 
affairs wherein EU organs could speak in one voice for 
the whole community and could render more important 
decisions on the basis of majority rule, rather than 
requiring the unanimous consent of all the member states. 
However, the significant reduction in the sovereignty of 
the member nations that such changes entail requires a 
higher level of citizen commitment to the EU than 
currently exists.
19  
Deepening entails exacting considerable sacrifices by 
some members of the collectivity that predominantly 
benefit others. Thus, for example, if stronger EU-wide 
measures were adopted to slow down inflation, some 
members would as a result likely experience much slower 
growth, while others, whose growth was slower to begin 
with, might not be much affected. If stronger anti-
terrorism measures were introduced across the EU, some 
member nations would have to adopt considerable 
changes to their domestic laws and in the way authorities 
conduct themselves – changes that nations with strong 
civil rights traditions are likely to find very troubling – 
while other nations that had already recalibrated their 
anti-terrorism regimes would be relatively unaffected. 
Moreover, for EU-wide programmes, financial costs and 
benefits will also be unequally distributed; some nations 
will mostly pay while other member nations mostly 
benefit from EU-wide income and wealth transfer.  
 Such inequalities of burdens and benefits are routinely 
accepted within well established nations. Thus, in the 
United States, few complain that southern states 
contribute less to federal revenues while gaining a 
disproportionate share of federal outlays. After 
reunification, Germany’s western states contributed very 
large amounts to the new lands’, the eastern states. 
However, if the beneficiaries are not considered parts of 
one’s community, there is a much lower tolerance for 
such reallocations and wealth transfers. Given that the 
majority of the EU citizens seem not ready to make such 
sacrifices on a growing scale, deepening has to be 
delayed until community commitments are enhanced.  
c.  Slow down the Commission 
  The EU institutions, especially the Commission, have 
acted on a significant number of occasions in ways that 
                                                                                              
with a nation, such as political loyalty and decision-making 
power – based not on an aggregate of national decisions or 
those made by representatives of the member states, but rather 
on those made by the supranational bodies themselves. It is 
useful to think about supranationality as a composite of several 
elements. For more discussion, see Etzioni From Empire to 
Community, op. cit., Ch. 12. 
19 For a discussion of the strains on the EU caused by 
integration discussions, see Richard H. Roberts, “Gaia and 
Europea: Religion and Legitimation Crisis in the ‘New 
Europe’”, in Ralf Rogowski and Charles Turner (eds), The 
Shape of the New Europe, New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006; Moravcsik “Europe’s Integration at 
Century’s End”, op. cit., p. 3 & p. 5. 4 | Amitai Etzioni 
alienate the citizens from the EU project, as described 
below: 
i) Negotiations about major additions and changes to EU 
treaties and institutions have often been conducted in off-
the-record meetings, employing highly legalistic and 
technical terms or obfuscating language. French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy expressed this point well when he 
interpreted the 2008 Irish ‘no’ vote on the Lisbon Treaty 
as a rejection of a “…certain Europe that is too 
technocratic, too abstract, too distant.”
20 
To reduce citizen alienation, important decisions are best 
preceded by consensus-building (discussed below). 
Granted, this democratisation would substantially reduce 
the speed and scope of the actions that the Commission 
can undertake. This trade-off, though, can no longer be 
avoided.  
ii) The European Commission has often acted below the 
radar, introducing numerous EU-wide measures with 
little or no prior public notification, consensus-building 
or even public disclosure after the fact. To reduce 
alienation the Commission will have to become more 
transparent, through measures such as conducting more 
open meetings, posting advance notice, granting time for 
public commentary and laying out its plan for action in 
terms readily understood by the public. 
iii) Enforcement of the measures already in place has 
been highly uneven (sometimes referred to as the 
‘compliance gap’).
21 Hence, citizens of nations with 
relatively high compliance levels feel exploited. To 
reduce citizen alienation, the EU should dedicate more 
resources to reduce the compliance gap. This, in turn, 
may entail reducing the number of regulations, 
instructions and other measures the Commission can 
issue each year – again, a trade-off that seems cannot 
long be avoided. 
iv) EU officials, as well as national leaders who support 
the EU project, have shown by word and deed a 
disrespect for the people – and the democratic process.
22 I 
already referred to the broken promises of submitting 
new treaties to referendums. The same disrespectful 
attitude is revealed when a treaty is resubmitted for a vote 
soon after being voted down, with only minor 
modifications, if any. One gets the impression that some 
EU officials would like to repeatedly submit the same 
measures to the electorate time and again until they get 
the desired result. Four weeks after Ireland’s voters had 
                                                      
20 “Nicolas Sarkozy’s European apotheosis”, The Economist, 
28 June 2008, p. 56. 
21 For four examples of ineffective implementation of EU 
policy, see Christoph Knill, “European Politics: Impact of 
National Administrative Traditions”, Journal of Public Policy 
18:1, January-April 1998, pp. 1-28. 
22 For more discussion, see Marion Demossier, “Introduction” 
in Demossier (ed.), The European Puzzle: The Political 
Restructuring of Cultural Identities at a Time of Transition, 
New York, NY: Berghan Books, 2007, pp. 2-3. 
rejected the Lisbon Treaty, Sarkozy, privately stated that 
the Irish would have to vote again.
23 Lest one think the 
recent Irish vote is a singular occurrence, the same 
treatment was given to Irish voters when they rejected the 
Nice Treaty in 2001 and to Danish voters when they 
rejected the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.
24 Beyond the 
often-cited democratic deficit,
25 an attitude of superiority 
among some officials and leaders is hurting the EU 
project. Following Ireland’s recent vote against the 
Lisbon Treaty, German interior minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble grumbled publicly about “letting a few million 
Irish make decisions for 495 million Europeans.”
26 The 
Commission and other EU authorities best not promote 
policies and changes in institutions that the majority of 
the citizens of the EU have shown they reject.  
At the same time, if leaders feel that the public 
sentiments are untutored and antithetical to the common 
good, they need not simply yield to these preferences. EU 
officials can work to gain the support of the citizens for 
the courses of action they believe ought to be followed. 
If, at the end of the day, these officials fail to be 
persuasive, they best give way. Although extended EU-
building requires greatly reducing the democratic deficit 
through the measures listed above, these by themselves 
will not suffice unless the community deficit is 
curtailed.
27 
3.  Measures that build community 
a.  Foster EU-wide public dialogues  
Societies, even ones as large as the United States, engage 
in dialogues about public policies. Typically, just one or 
two topics top the public dialogue agenda, for instance, 
whether or not to allow gay marriages or whether the 
death penalty should be tolerated. These dialogues 
                                                      
23 “Vote Early, Vote Often,” The Economist, 24 July 2008 
(available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?stor
y_id=11792298). 
24 Ibid. 
25 See e.g. Jonathan Bowman, “The European Union 
Democratic Deficit: Federalists, Skeptics, and Revisionists”, 
European Journal of Political Theory, 5:2, 2006, pp. 191-212; 
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, “Why there is a democratic 
deficit in the EU”, European Governance Papers C-05-02, 14 
March 2005; Myrto Tsakatika, “Governance vs. politics: the 
European Union’s constitutive ‘democratic deficit’”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 14:6, September 2007, pp. 867–885. 
26 Derek Scally, “Minister suggests Ireland take a 'break' from 
EU CDU distances itself from comments”, Irish Times, 16 June 
2008 
(http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0616/1213
369968838.html). 
27 For more discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, “The Community 
Deficit”, The Journal of Common Market Studies, 45:1, 2007, 
pp. 23-42; see also Moravcsik, “Europe’s Integration at 
Century’s End”, op. cit., p. 50. Closing the Community Deficit in the EU | 5 
mainly concern values and are not dominated by 
considerations of facts. They often seem endless and 
impassionate, but actually frequently lead to new, widely 
shared public understandings. Such understandings, in 
turn, often provide a well-grounded basis for changes in 
public policy and institutions; they generate new sources 
of legitimacy. In the United States, for instance, public 
dialogues prepared the ground for new legislation to 
protect the environment and for the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency. Such dialogues also 
preceded the abolition of legal segregation and the 
forming of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.
28  
The fact that the majority of EU citizens feel ill-informed 
about the EU and the actions of its various institutions 
only enhances the need to promote dialogue.
29 
Referendums have long been criticised as anti-democratic 
for, among other concerns, their tendency to express the 
passion of the moment rather than the results of 
deliberations.
30 Hence the need to allow for dialogues 
that provide periods during which people can consult 
with each other and their leaders before referendums take 
place. Announcing that a given matter will be subject to a 
binding vote a number of months down the road is an 
effective way to trigger discussion. 
Public dialogues and some referendums do take place in 
Europe, but they are, as a rule, conducted within each 
nation. This is in part because people still see themselves 
as primarily citizens of this or that nation rather than as 
Europeans, and in part because the points of closure – the 
endpoints or changes in public policy that these dialogues 
lead to or support – often are on the national level rather 
than EU-wide. To build the support needed for enhanced 
supranational institutions and decision-making of the EU, 
public dialogues and referendums best take place in all 
member nations at the same time and be tied to decisions 
to be made on the EU and not the national level.  
The issues to be discussed and voted on at an EU-wide 
level need to be salient enough to draw the people into 
participating. Suggested changes in immigration policies 
are an obvious example. Finally, to succeed, participating 
citizens must be able to trust that the results of these 
referendums will be fully binding, that the EU officials 
will heed them rather than seek to work their way around 
them. 
                                                      
28 For more discussion on Moral Dialogues, see Amitai Etzioni, 
The New Golden Rule, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996. 
29 “The European Parliament”, Special Eurobarometer 288 / 
Wave 68.1, TNS Opinion and Social, March, 2008; “The 
Future of Europe”, Special Eurobarometer, 251 / Wave 65.1, 
TNS Opinion and Social, May 2006. 
30 For more on this and other failures of the EU referendum 
process, see Gary Marks, “The EU’s Direct Democratic 
Surplus”, paper delivered at American Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, 28-31 August 2008. 
b.  Develop EU-wide media and language 
Citizens see the EU largely through their respective 
national and cultural lenses. For a shift in orientation to 
occur, for more people to adopt a community-wide 
perspective, some form of a shared media is needed, 
which can be accessed by citizens in different parts of the 
EU. Unfortunately, various attempts to fashion a 
European newspaper have not truly taken off. The same 
holds for other media, such as television and radio. The 
internet fragments the public more than it builds one 
shared audience. The EU should create a sort of 
European Broadcasting Agency, modelled on the BBC, 
which would draw on public budgets but have 
autonomous control of the content of the broadcasts. Its 
mandate would be to provide news and interpret it from a 
European perspective. (From this viewpoint it might be 
of interest to compare Foreign Affairs, which is published 
from an American perspective, with Foreign Policy, 
which deliberately recast itself to adopt a global 
perspective.) It would also include brief items about what 
is happening in the various member states, as if they were 
parts of the same country, somewhat the way the 
American newspaper USA Today provides news about 
the 50 American states.
31 
Initially, EU-wide broadcasts may well have to be 
translated into the 23 languages that are the spoken by the 
EU citizens. However, if the EU is to move towards 
becoming more of a community, it would be much 
assisted if all the citizens would learn the same language. 
Historically, coming to share a language has played a key 
role in many community-building endeavours. In the EU, 
though, reference is not to developing one primary 
tongue,  but to one in addition to it, in other words, a 
common second language. English is the only serious 
candidate for this position, but so far France, Germany 
and Italy, among others, have strongly opposed this 
development, thus slowing down the development of a 
shared European second language.
32  
c.  EU-wide voting 
As EU consensus solidifies, the EU should move towards 
EU-wide voting on EU candidates, rather than the current 
system in which votes for the EU Parliament are still 
conducted largely for national candidates, on national 
bases. Currently, most candidates running for a seat in the 
                                                      
31 For another perspective on the media’s role in building trust 
for European institutions, see Patrick Bijssmans and Christina 
Altideds, “Bridging the Gap between EU Politics and Citizens? 
The European Commission, National Media and EU Affairs in 
the Public Sphere,” Journal of European Integration, 29:3, 
July 2007, pp. 323-340. 
32 For more discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, “A Global, 
Community Building Language”, International Studies 
Perspectives,  9:2, May 2008, pp. 113-127; Amitai Etzioni, 
“Lost in too many translations”, The European Voice, 17 July 
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European Parliament are put up by national parties, and 
campaign only in their home country. In the European 
Parliament, most ‘European parties’ are largely made of 
alliances between pre-existing national parties; they 
function less like political parties and more like 
international coalitions. A switch to European parties and 
candidates raises numerous issues concerning whether 
different weight should be assigned to the voters of 
various countries and ways to protect minorities. These 
two complex points require separate treatment. 
d.  Functionalism and symbolism are lagging 
factors 
Two factors that some hypothesised would serve as 
community-builders have carried little weight so far, but 
they are likely to carry more as EU-wide shared public 
understanding, dialogue, media, language, and voting 
evolve.  
First, some expected the shift of decision-making power 
to ‘Brussels’ to lead to a shift in people’s commitment to 
the EU (a thesis referred to sometimes as 
neofunctionalism).
33 So far, though, when functions were 
shifted to EU-wide institutions without first building up 
consensus and legitimacy, these shifts generated more 
alienation than enhanced commitment to the community. 
If the ground was properly prepared, neofunctionalism 
would be much more likely to succeed. 
Neofunctionalism, thus, turns out to be a lagging rather 
than a leading factor. 
The same holds for symbolism. The EU has tried to build 
community by promoting symbols that express the new 
collectivity, such as the EU flag, a European hymn, EU 
markings on motor vehicle license plates, the marking of 
cultural and historical sites, and others.
34 So far these 
symbols have not carried much weight in terms of 
building a commitment to the EU.
35 Such symbols can 
                                                      
33 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1958; Lee McGowan, “Theorising European 
Integration: revisiting neofunctionalism and testing its 
suitability for explaining the development of EC competition 
policy?”, European Integration online Papers, 25 May 2007; 
Andrew Moravcsik, “The European Constitutional 
Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 12:2, 2005, pp. 349-386; Joseph Nye 
Jr.,  Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional 
Organization,  Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1971; P.C. 
Schmitter, “Three Neofunctional Hypotheses about 
International Integration”, International Organization 23, 
1969, pp. 297-317; P.C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the 
Legacy of Neofunctionalism”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 12:2, 2006, pp. 255-272.  
34 For a collection of scholarly essays on various issues raised 
by efforts to construct a European identity not based on 
Christianity and anti-Islamic sentiments, see Demossier (ed.), 
The European Puzzle, op. cit. 
35 Demossier writes: “the European Union has, over the years, 
put increasing emphasis on the cultural construction of the 
express commitments once they are in place, and even 
enhance them to some extent once they are evolving. 
They cannot engender such commitment when the basic 
underlying public support is lacking.  
Jurgen Habermas has argued that forming a constitution 
would lead to a crystallization of Europe in the sense of 
developing a unified identity and culture.
36 Others have 
pointed to the unifying, identity-building power of 
“constitutional moments”, of the kind the American 
colonies experienced in Philadelphia in 1787. Reference 
is to historical occasions in which different segments of a 
new collectivity rose to find a common cause and 
institutionalize an evolving core of shared values. Such 
“moments” do not occur in a vacuum, but typically 
reflect the culmination of long social and political 
developments that preceded them. Moreover, much of the 
consolidation often follows later. When neither the 
preparatory nor after-the-act developments are present, 
constitution-writing does not possess some kind of 
magical power to build new shared identity. The 
persistence of political strife and inter-tribal violence 
after the ratification of new constitutions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, two long-established nations, is evidence 
for this point. 
e. Unprecedented but… 
Many doubt that the EU can be turned into a collectivity 
that has many of the elements of a national community –
into a United States of Europe. There are strong reasons 
to expect that this opinion is a valid one. All previous 
attempts to form supranational communities have failed, 
including those of the United Arab Republic, the 
Federation of the West Indies, and even a much less 
ambitious coming together, the Nordic Council.
37 When 
nations were forced into a federation, for instance by 
Russia in the Soviet era, the federation came apart and 
the member nations were restored to full autonomy as 
soon as the coercive vise was broken. The same holds for 
Yugoslavia. 
One may suggest that history is rich with cases in which 
previously autonomous communities merged, one way or 
another, to form more encompassing ones. Germany was 
formed by the unification of some 39 independent states; 
                                                                                              
mythical figure of the European through a range of cultural 
policies, but it has largely failed in its attempt to construct a 
shared sense of Europeanness.” Marion Demossier, “The 
Political Structuring of Cultural Identities” in Marion 
Demossier (ed.), The European Puzzle, op. cit., p. 50. See also 
C. Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European 
Integration, London: Routledge, 2000. 
36 Jurgen Habermas, “Why Europe needs a Constitution”, in 
The Shape of the New Europe, Ralf Rogowski and Charles 
Turner (eds), New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2006, pp. 25-45; Roberts, “Gaia and Europe,” op. cit., p. 148. 
37 For a comparative analysis of these three failed unions, see 
Etzioni, Political Unification Revisited, op. cit. Closing the Community Deficit in the EU | 7 
Italy, by the unification of numerous provinces and areas. 
The United States itself was composed of 13 colonies 
(though its two regions did not coalesce into one society 
until after the Civil War). However, all these instances of 
community-building took place before nationalism took 
root and before the masses became actively involved in 
the political process. That is, before the sense of self and 
the identity of the citizens became deeply associated with 
their nation state. Indeed, it is the building of nations, 
largely in the 19
th and 20
th centuries, that allowed the 
integration of pre-national communities into the new, 
national one. 
To reiterate, there is no precedent for the citizens of a 
fully formed nation to consent to its being absorbed into 
a more encompassing community, or for allowing loyalty 
to the new community to take precedent (in cases of 
conflict) over current national loyalties that are deeply 
held. One scholar’s observation about Northern Ireland 
applies much more widely:  
…national identities so dominate the cultural 
identifications of border people, of all 
people…that, to the extent that it is acknowledged 
as a possible alternative, European identity is often 
scoffed at as little more than a tactic to get 
funding, or to support the European stance of a 
local political party.
38 
That communities with weak identity and shared sense of 
self often jell only around negative causes, for instance, 
in opposition to some real or imaginary enemy or 
outsider, is a regrettable but undeniable sociological fact. 
Many new nations jelled in opposition to colonial 
powers. Hence, it is revealing that when the majority of 
the European citizens strongly opposed the course the 
United States followed in Iraq in 2003 and in the years 
that followed, the EU was still unable to build on this 
consensus to speak in one voice, to form a shared identity 
and policy.  
One may suggest, again with regret, that the European 
identity is largely Christian and anti-Muslim. Soledad 
Garcia put it as follows: 
                                                      
38 T.M. Wilson, “Agendas in Conflict: Nation, State and 
Europe in the Northern Ireland Borderlands”, in I. Bellier and 
T.M. Wilson (eds), An Anthropology of the European Union, 
Oxford: Berg, 2000, pp. 137-158, quoted in Ralph Grillo, 
“European Identity in a Transnational Era”, in Demossier (ed.), 
The European Puzzle, op. cit., p. 78. 
The increasing consensus on what is considered 
dangerous in Western Europe (terrorism, pollution, 
drugs consumption, urban crime, on one side, and 
Islamic fundamentalism, uncontrolled immigration 
from certain parts of the world on the other) 
constitutes a substantial common ground for 
sharing perceptions of what we need to be 
protected from, not only as individuals but also as 
Europeans.
39 
As Professor Ralph Grillo of the University of Sussex 
notes, “already by the early 1990s, fundamentalism had 
become ‘Europe’s latest ‘other’…Islamism is constructed 
as what Europe is not, and an exclusionary European 
identity is projected as its opposite.”
40 Margaret Thatcher 
even went so far as to refer to fundamentalism as the 
“new Bolshevism”.
41 So far, however, such consensus 
has served mainly those who wish to exclude Turkey 
from the EU, limit immigration and other such policies, 
but has not provided a new normative foundation for 
building a more communal EU. 
If the EU is unable to engage in much stronger and more 
affirmative community-building, if there is no 
significantly greater transfer of commitments and 
loyalties from the citizens of the member nations to the 
new evolving political community, the EU will be unable 
to sustain the kind of encompassing, significant and 
salient collective public policies and endeavours it seeks 
to advance. The EU needs either to move up to a higher 
level of community or retreat to being a free trade zone 
enriched by numerous legal and administrative shared 
arrangements, but not much more. 
The world is watching both because of the importance of 
the EU per se, and because several other regional bodies, 
in much earlier states of supranational development, want 
to learn the best ways to engage in community-building 
when the members of the community are nation states. 
                                                      
39 S. Garcia, “Europe’s Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers 
of Citizenship”, in S. Garcia (ed.), European Identity and the 
Search for Legitimacy, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 14, quoted in 
Ralph Grillo, “European identity in a Transnational Era” in 
Marion Demossier, ed., The European Puzzle, op. cit., p. 78. 
40 Grillo, ibid. 
41 Margaret Thatcher, “Islamism is the New Bolshevism,” The 
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